According to the court, the reasons for the increase are that it is "fair, reasonable and just," it accords with the view of society as a whole, and it results in "proportionate" awards which take into account not only changes in economic circumstances but also the impact of awards upon society. Future levels are to be adjusted in line with the rise in the Retail Prices Index, and further appellate consideration will not be necessary unless the awards again become significantly out of line with the standards identified. To the casual observer, these views appear eminently sensible. However, the judgment and, more particularly, the earlier Law
Commission report leave this reviewer with a sense of unease. Certain perspectives upon the tort system, and the criticisms which have been made of it, seem to have been entirely forgotten. This note, in a polemical fashion, tries to restore a little of the balance.
It does so by emphasising the disproportionate importance of PSLA in the award of damages, and the failure of students and others to appreciate what the tort system in practice actually achieves. It notes that PSLA is a major cause of the excessive cost, inefficiency and injustice of the tort system. It casts doubt upon surveys purporting to justify an increase in damages for pain and suffering by 4 
See the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers response to the Law Commission Consultation Paper
No 140 on non-pecuniary loss, and its submission made to the Court of Appeal in Heil's case. 5 The Law Commission Report No 257, Damages For Non-Pecuniary Loss (1999) is so described by Tony Weir, A Casebook On Tort (9th ed 2000) (Sweet and Maxwell, London) 636. 6 Although none of the claimants applied for permission to appeal when the Court of Appeal judgment was handed down, two of them later did seek leave from the House of Lords. However, from information supplied to the author by the relevant firm of solicitors, Russell, Jones and Walker, the appeal is not now being pursued because of concerns about the costs and the risks involved.
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reference to the popular will. It reminds readers of criticisms of tort based on distributive justice arguments, and it contrasts these with the corrective justice perspective which determined not only the scope of the Law Commission review of the law of damages, but also the proposals for reform it put forward. It concludes that the decision in Heil v Rankin is not as obviously in the public interest as the rhetoric of the judges or the Law Commission would have us suppose.
Calculating The Limited Increase In Damages
The Law Commission proposed a large increase in damages for PSLA. A wide range of cases would have been affected. It suggested that awards over £3,000 should be doubled or increased at least by half. 7 By contrast, Heil v Rankin makes no change in damages for non-pecuniary loss assessed at, or below, £10,000; 8 but where such damages would have been £150,000, as in the case of tetraplegia or severe brain damage, the amount is to be increased by a third to £200,000; and between £10,000 and £150,000 there is to be a progressive increase from 0 per cent to 33 1/3 per cent so that, for example, in the middle of the range, an award of £80,000 is to be increased by 17 per cent to about £95,000.
At the end of its judgment the court even included a simple graph indicating the approximate level of increase. This unique appendage to a law report can make the calculation look easier than in fact it is, and a mathematical formula has since been published to enable the new level of damages to be set. 9 Lawyers traditionally have been amongst the least numerate of professionals, and suspicious of anything other 7 Report, above n 5, at para 5.6. For injuries between £2,001 and £3,000 it recommended a tapered increase of less than a factor of 1.5 so that an award of £2,500 should be uplifted by 25 per cent.
8 This threshold was suggested by the Forum of Insurance Lawyers at p 45 of their submission to the court. It would cut out of the system almost all claims presently processed under the "fast track,"
being for amounts below £15,000 in total, including financial loss.
9 Somewhat surprisingly, the author could find no other instance of the use of a graph in a UK is increasingly difficult to assert that a subjective individualised system of justice is being employed to return the claimant to anything even approaching the pre-accident position. No matter that it is the index finger of a concert pianist that has been lost, she will get only a little more than the £9,500 PSLA specified in the book. Of course, she may also be entitled to a large sum for loss of earnings, but the judge will still be incapable of performing a digital transplant. PSLA is compensation in a very special sense; unlike damages for money lost and expenses incurred, it cannot provide an equivalent to that which has been destroyed. It is an artificial sum and, increasingly, it is mechanically assessed.
The Importance Of Small Claims To The Tort System
Although both the Court of Appeal and the Law Commission looked at the wider social and economic circumstances which related to the proposed increase in damages, there is one crucial fact which they either ignored or which escaped their attention. It is the foundation for a perspective upon personal injury claims which is of vital importance, and it is extraordinary that the Law Commission, in particular, failed to highlight this fact. Buried in the middle of its report is an acknowledgement that in the region of $265,000 had been established. See J. Cassels, Remedies: The Law Of Damages (2000) (Irwin Law, Toronto) 159. The limit is comparable to that specified by the JSB guidelines. 17 The author was one of few British representatives at a congress dealing with the rationalisation of medico-legal assessment of non-economic loss which was held in Germany, at the Academy of Although the Law Commission notes the fact at para 3.38 of its report, it fails to give it the prominence it deserves.
The relative importance of PSLA is reduced by two factors. Council noted that the average sum obtained in the 150,000 union-backed cases in 1991 was under little, if any, financial loss. They make a full recovery from their bodily injury and have no continuing ill effects. 21 They make no claim for any social security benefit as a result of their accident. 22 In the minority of cases where benefit is claimed, PSLA is the only part of the award of damages from which no social security can be deducted. 23 This means that in a few cases the damages claim, in effect, is being made only for the non-pecuniary loss. In settlements in general the largest component by far is the payment for pain and suffering. The stereotypical injury is the minor whiplash which follows a low-speed car "shunt." It is these type of cases which account for the extraordinarily high costs of the system compared to the damages it pays out. 24 If it had been wholly in public hands, tort would have been radically revised and then privatised some years ago. 23 Lewis, above n 22, para 13.33. As a result of the reforms made by the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997 the compensation awarded for PSLA has now been ringfenced so that no deduction for benefit can be made from that part of the award. 24 The figures always bear repetition. The Pearson Commission, above n 18, estimated that the cost of operating the tort system amounted to 85 per cent of the value of tort payments distributed to claimants. See vol 1 para 256. The Lord Chancellor's Civil Justice Review (Cm 394, 1986 ) estimated that the cost of the tort system consumed 50 to 70 per cent of the total compensation awarded in personal injury cases. See also Pleasence, above n 20 at 64, who found a damages to costs ratio of 2.27:1, and costs exceeding damages in 22 per cent of successful cases.
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The 'missing' fact is thus of crucial importance in understanding the tort system, especially when its future is being debated and the relative priority of competing claims for compensation is being considered. It is also fundamental in making an assessment of the cost of any changes to be made. The extraordinary failure to focus on the relative importance of PSLA is perhaps a measure of how attitudes have changed since the post-Thalidomide era of the 1970's when the role and future of the tort system as a whole was in question. Although our empirical understanding of the tort system has continued to improve, academics and law reformers are now less likely to address the fundamental issues exposed by the facts and figures.
Small claims thus constitute the everyday battleground over which insurers and claimants' representatives fight. Their predominance is the reason why insurers have not been too dismayed by Heil v Rankin. Not only is there to be no increase in PSLA assessed at £10,000 or below, but also the tapered increase above that threshold figure is such that, at the lower end of the scale, the effect of the increase is negligible.
Even at £30,000 -corresponding to the total loss of an eye -the increase in damages is less than £1,500. This is not enough to upset the course of settlement negotiations in the vast majority of cases. annual rate of about 650,000 a year. Thus the ABI figure of 168,000 claimants affected is roughly a quarter of the total. However, this does not take account of the fact that the annual figure includes all tort claims, not just those where the compensation was paid by a member of the ABI. In addition, these figures must now be revised upwards because the numbers of claims has continued to grow.
According to information received by the author from the DSS, the total number of claims notified in the financial year 1999-2000 was over 716,000, a rise of ten per cent since the six months to the end of September 1998.
28 Cf Bennett's concern about insurers' setting of premiums and access to reserves in "Personal Injuries:
General Damages -Minor Increases Only" [2000] JPIL 129 at 135.
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The Influence Of Surveys And Representations
The court decided that it was only appropriate to interfere with the level of damages if there was a clear need to do so. Although persuaded by the Law Commission report that there was such a need, it took a different view of the material upon which the Commission relied. In particular, it attached much less importance than the Commission to the surveys and empirical studies which had formed an important feature of its report, although the court emphasised that the level of damages must not be out of line with what society as a whole would view as being reasonable. The Commission relied heavily on four sources in order to justify increasing damages in more serious cases:
• A study it commissioned from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) concerning public opinion about the level of damages.
29
• Hazel Genn's 1994 general report for the Commission's damages project entitled "How Much Is Enough?"
30
• 32 Above n 15.
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The first two studies were much criticised by the defendants in Heil, 33 and the Court of Appeal preferred instead to rely on the response to the consultation. This had strongly endorsed an increase in the upper level of awards. Although half of the respondents agreed that damages for minor injuries were not too low, the Law Commission reported that 74.5 per cent of them believed that damages had failed to keep pace with inflation and that more should be awarded to those suffering very serious injuries. As usual, these respondents were predominantly lawyers closely connected to the present system, most of them being personal injury practitioners. The counting of heads and assembling of percentages in relation to those who reply to Law
Commission documents is not likely to report results which reflect the views of other than a cross-section of interested lawyers. It is not surprising that they are likely to carry weight and be acceptable to judges. However, these percentage opinions by no means necessarily reflect whether society as a whole would perceive the increase in damages as reasonable, and yet this was the key factor which the court continued to stress.
When it came to considering the empirical surveys, the court recognised that there were great difficulties in carrying out such work. However, it severely criticised the ONS survey for failing to draw sufficient attention to the fact that very substantial damages for pecuniary loss could be awarded in addition to that for PSLA.
Interviewees were not told, for example, that the provision of aids and equipment, adapted accommodation, and holidays would be specifically covered in the award for pecuniary loss. Nor were they necessarily aware that, in the most serious injury cases, the award for lost earnings and the cost of care is likely to be many times the size of that for PSLA. 34 Similarly, the dissatisfaction found by Genn in her survey of 33 The ABI commissioned a report from James Rothwell, an independent marketing and economic research consultant, which made detailed criticisms of the adequacy of the research upon which reliance was placed.
Thus in one of Heil test cases, Warren v The Northern General Hospital NHS Trust, the Court of
Appeal increased the damages by £40,000 but this amounted to less than 1.4 per cent of the total award of almost £3 million.
recipients of damages awards could be explained for reasons other than unhappiness about the amount given for PSLA.
With regard to the ONS attempt to seek views after trying to form a link between an increase in damages and the payment of insurance premiums, the court thought that the link had not been made sufficiently explicit and therefore the survey was unreliable. It also favoured the investigation of another link not pursued by the
ONS. It would have liked to have seen what people would have said if a connection
had been drawn between an increase in damages and the diminished resources which may then be available to the National Health Service (NHS) as a result.
The use of "vox pop" to justify changes in the tort system is fraught with danger. The use of simple, basic questions can produce predictable responses. It would be no surprise to find that people would award more compensation to those with serious injuries, just as they would have "the government" increase the wages of nurses, double the value of old aged pensions, and waive contributions to residential care. The difficulties lie, firstly, in trying to assess the extent to which they would pay to fund the increased payments once they realise it is they who are paying, and, secondly, in placing their proposals for increased expenditure in some order of priority. The formulation and scope of the questions depends upon the perspective from which the surveys are conducted. One major premise at the heart of the Law Commission series of reports on damages is that the tort system itself must remain in place. Its remit was to review the law of damages for personal injury but this did not allow for any wider review of the efficacy of the tort system as a whole. This crucial limitation is briefly mentioned at the beginning of a couple of its earlier reports. 14 the losses which they might choose to insure themselves against if they were to take out a policy against being involved in an accident causing personal injury. Which would they regard as the most important loss to insure against: an interruption in earnings; the cost of medical and other care; or PSLA? The inevitably low priority given to PSLA would be all the more apparent if it were explained that the premium to be paid would be more than doubled if it were to cover pain and suffering. It is clear that those who are knowledgeable about the risks of accident or illness, and seek policies to protect themselves against such eventualities, do not wish to pay much higher premiums for a type of loss for which money cannot easily provide a substitute.
If it were left to market forces there would be little cover for PSLA. 40 This is not to say that some form of recognition of non-pecuniary loss is not wanted in an ideal world, but it is clear that lost earnings and out-of-pocket expenses come first and, for the great majority of accident victims, these are losses which are not being met. The tort system simply fails to meet these basic needs. This view -which exposes the law of tort as both extremely limited in coverage and yet extravagant in content -cannot be found in the Law Commission report or the Court of Appeal decision.
The Relevance Of Other Courts And Countries
Generally the Court of Appeal attached little importance to the value of awards in other jurisdictions and areas of law. For example, it gave less weight than did the Commission to the level of awards in Northern Ireland, which generally are double those found in the rest of the UK. It explained these higher awards as being linked to previous levels when juries had been used. On the other hand, the court was prepared to attach more importance than the Commission to awards in EU and EFTA countries. 
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had been dealt with in detail by the Commission. 41 Decisions of tribunals in employment and discrimination cases, and of courts in defamation and police liability cases were similarly thought irrelevant. Significantly, no mention was made by the court, and little by the Commission, of how compensation for the great majority of accident victims would be assessed: that is, no one noted the principles which a social security tribunal would employ. 42 Of course, the difficulty with making comparisons is that for loss of enjoyment and injury to the senses there can never be a "right"
figure. Examination of alternative compensation can expose fundamental issues concerning the role of tort law and its relationship to other welfare systems, and the court gave little time to it.
The Increase In Life Expectancy
In deciding to award more money only in cases of more serious injury, the court was much influenced by the increase in life expectancy which we now enjoy. It means that the effects of more serious injuries are endured for longer. The change is most apparent in cases of extreme injury. The life expectancy of paraplegics and tetraplegics, for example, is much greater than it was thirty years ago. Insurers countered the argument by noting that treatment and medication had also improved.
Nevertheless, the court held that these fell far short of compensating the individual for the increased pain and suffering caused by permanent disabilities continuing throughout the increasing life span. Living longer as a collateral benefit was not discussed; instead longer life was equated with more pain and therefore more money.
Updating By Reference to Prices Not Earnings
According to Weir, the Law Commission report was unpersuasive: "While stating that there is no demonstrably right view on quantum, its proposal to increase 41 See paras 3.73 -3.85 of Law Commission Report No 257, above n 5. 42 The Commission dismissed Atiyah's criticism that its consultation paper had failed to examine social security payments. It boldly stated that they provided no useful guide because there was "no sense in which the social security system is designed to be corrective justice and therefore to be fully Two examples, were given by the Court of Appeal in Heil: claims for special holiday arrangements, and claims for adaptation and improvement of the conditions in which the claimant now lives. If specific sums are allocated for these purposes there is a danger of double accounting. For example, the inability to take a normal holiday could be taken into account as an item of financial loss as well as figuring in the overall assessment of PSLA. The court recognised this danger. In addition, losses which now were pleaded as aspects of the financial loss claim rather than forming part of the claim for non-pecuniary loss could help account for the failure of PSLA to keep pace with inflation. Even though there had been this cross-over of certain items of loss, the court concluded that there should still be an increase for non-pecuniary loss in serious cases.
The Wider Economic Effects
Although the court was not directly influenced by the substantial rise in damages for pecuniary loss in recent years, it emphasised that it was concerned with the economic consequences of its decision upon not only defendants as a group, but also society as a whole. to pay was a matter of concern. It cited with approval Diplock LJ's view that: "To avoid fixing the scale at a level which would materially affect the cost of living or disturb the current social pattern is a factor, Benthamite no doubt in origin, in the empirical process by which the maximum/datum is determined." 47 Here, therefore, the court differed from the Commission which had attached little importance to these matters and had suggested that cost was irrelevant.
However, the court distinguished its task in assessing PSLA from its assessment of pecuniary loss. In cases such as Wells it suggested that the court is only required to make the correct calculation, and economic consequences are irrelevant.
But in setting the level of PSLA the court was concerned with wider questions of social policy. In particular, for example, the impact upon the resources of the NHS was regarded as a relevant factor. NHS trusts are among those hardest hit by the Heil decision because clinical negligence claims are usually of a high value, being more likely to involve serious injury. For example, in Wales claims over £30,000 were expected to cost £17 million in the current financial year. If the Law Commission recommendations were implemented, a further £5 million would be required, a rise of 30 per cent. 48 Even taking into account the lower increases set by the Court of Appeal, it is clear that a more onerous burden has now been placed on the NHS. The court considered that it was in a position to appreciate fully the significant effect of its decision on the public at large and the NHS in particular.
47 Wise v Kaye [1962] 1 QB 638 at 670. Objection to the relevance of cost was one of the main reasons why an appeal to the Lords was contemplated, as discussed in n 6 above. 
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Conclusion: The Distorted Lens Of Corrective Justice
Atiyah's criticisms of PSLA are well known, and require only a brief summary here. PSLA is a secondary form of compensation, incapable of precise assessment and less able than pecuniary damages to provide an equivalent to what has been lost. A "correction" cannot be made. It is compensation deserving a lower priority than that awarded for financial loss. Few other systems of compensation make provision for PSLA, almost nothing being available from either social security or private insurance.
If left to market forces, people would not choose to purchase cover against such a loss.
Atiyah's arguments based on distributive justice emphasise how poorly the majority of accident victims are treated because they are unable to claim in tort. He exposes the fault principle as completely inadequate to justify the comparatively generous payments provided to the few whilst excluding the many. A reallocation of resources is required. In order to afford extending the base of compensation there would have to be a limit on the payment of secondary compensation. "It is perhaps only in the most serious cases of long-term pain and loss of faculty resulting from major physical injuries that there is a good case for damages for non-pecuniary loss."
49
By contrast the Law Commission rely on its terms of reference to justify giving these distributive justice arguments little space. They do not figure at all in the Court of Appeal judgment. The result is that, almost without argument, corrective justice is accepted as the only lens through which tort law can be viewed. For the unsuspecting student the many deficiencies of tort are masked by a decision which produces "fair, reasonable and just" compensation supposedly corresponding to the wishes of society.
The reliance upon empirical surveys and mathematical indices reinforce the 
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correctness of the approach. Damages are increased and the tort system strengthened.
Heil v Rankin improves the position of those able to establish liability as against those unable to do so. 50 It thus helps to entrench the tort system, making it increasingly difficult to revise radically the baseline and extend compensation for basic losses to those presently excluded. In this respect the decision is by no means the most significant case in recent years. However, the case also makes repeated claims to reflect society's sense of values. This article points out what should be obvious enough, that these claims are inevitably partial and depend upon the perspective through which accident compensation is viewed. This partiality requires that the explanation of law reform be in terms of the activity of moral entrepreneurs 51 rather than the general social interest mysteriously given body and voice by both the Law
Commission and the court in Heil v Rankin.
